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Abstract
When there is not one obvious candidate technology, entrants to a new in-
dustry face a non—trivial choice between longer lead times in the setting up of
production and a better chance that the technology could successfully deliver.
This paper shows how this tradeoff may yield gradual diffusion. Diffusion is
more protracted in industries where learning opportunities are more bountiful.
The equilibrium minimizes the long—run equilibrium price, just as in the stan-
dard Marshallian model of a competitive industry. The market structure does
not seem to affect the rate of diffusion with the monopoly choosing the same
rate of diffusion that prevails in competition despite restricting output.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Often entrants to a new industry face a substantial amount of uncertainty as to
what technology may work in the new setting. The natural response is to adapt
and try out technologies that have proven to work elsewhere. But there is usually
not a single obvious candidate technology. There are technologies that call for few
adaptations and short lead times before production may be attempted. There are
technologies that require substantially more adaptations and longer lead times. But
more adaptations and longer lead times could improve the chance that the chosen
technology would ever work in the new setting at all. These ideas go back to Alchian
(1959), who argued that the payoff for firms to choose a longer lead time is that
production costs tend to be lower to follow.
How long to wait out before production should be attempted is an important and
conscious decision for entrants. In this paper, we study how these decisions of non—
atomistic producers collectively yield gradual diffusion. The period of time to wait
out before attempting production is a period of learning by doing. Our analysis
assumes that it cannot be substituted at all by heavier investment in physical capital
or in personnel. This is probably somewhat extreme. But empirical evidence abound
to support the notion that productivity increases with experiences (Bahk and Gort
(1993), among many others). This suggests, at the very least, that firms cannot
entirely substitute away time as an input in the setting up of production.
The investment in terms of foregone income for technologies with shorter waiting
times is lower. But these technologies could be less likely to work at all. That the
benefits and costs of technologies with various waiting times could just cancel out
in equilibrium is a distinct possibility. In this case, there are staggered entries into
full—fledge production and gradual diffusion in equilibrium. We show that under
some appropriate parameterization of the demand curve, output follows the familiar
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S—shaped diffusion curve, and the density of technology choice is bell-shaped.
Clearly, the option to wait out longer before attempting production should only
be taken up if it yields a large enough improvement in the chance that production
could be successfully commenced. The analysis to follow shows that in competitive
markets, this turns into the condition that the last technology to be adopted is as-
sociated with the lowest long—run equilibrium price — a result only to be expected.
What is somewhat unexpected is that a monopoly would choose the same range of
technologies to try out as well. True, the monopoly restricts output. But the out-
put restriction is entirely through running each technology less intensively, while the
range of technologies to be tried out coincides with the range of technologies selected
in competitive markets.
This paper is, by all means, not the first paper to invoke learning by doing to help
generate gradual diffusion. The defining difference between the present paper and
previous analyzes that include, among others, Jovanovic and Lach (1989) and Rein-
ganum (1981), is that we assume that the benefits of learning are entirely internal,
whereas previous analyses concentrate on the spillovers of benefits from early to late
entrants. There are two major differences in the implications. First, where the bene-
fits of learning by doing are external, market size and the distribution of consumers’
willingness to pay could play decisive roles in the pace of diffusion. In a larger market
and in a market with more high income consumers, more firms would enter initially.
If the experiences acquired by early entrants spillover to subsequent entrants, the rate
of entry increases even further, speeding up the diffusion to low income consumers
as a result (Jovanovic and Lach (1989); Matsuyama (2002)). In the present model,
where the benefits of learning are purely internal, the pace of diffusion is a function
of technology only, but not of demand. And how long it takes for the product of the
new industry to diffuse to any given consumer does not depend on market size nor
the distribution of income. Second, entry and diffusion tend to be more gradual in
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models of external learning when productivity increases rapidly with industry—wide
experience. The reason is that if entries instead cluster temporally, a deviating firm
that chooses to wait just a bit longer before entry would become an order of magni-
tude more productive (Jovanovic and Lach (1989). We show that the opposite is true
in this paper. That is, with internal learning, entry tends to be concentrated tempo-
rally in case the benefits of learning increase rapidly with experience and flattens out
quickly.
As a theory of how different technologies would be simultaneously adopted, the pa-
per is related to the literature on appropriate technology (Basu andWeil (1998)). This
paper is closest to Jovanovic (2004) who also considers how differences in production
lead times among firms result in staggered entries and exits and gradual diffusion.
The major difference is that the present paper models lead times as conscious de-
cisions of firms, whereas Jovanovic (2004) assumes that production lead times for
individual producers follow the same stochastic process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the basic
setup and presents a 2—technology example. Section 3 generalizes to analyzing where
there is a continuum of technology. Section 4 illustrates, via two examples, how
the lifecycle of the industry depends on whether learning is primarily active in the
sense of Ericson and Pakes (1995, 1998) or passive in the sense of Jovanovic (1982).
Section 5 explains how in the present model the roles played by demand on the rate
of diffusion is decidedly minor. Section 6 compares the monopoly’s technology choice
with a competitive industry’s technology choice. Section 7 concludes.
2. TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
We study an industry that faces a demand curve q = D (p), where q is industry
output and p is industry price. Potential entrants into the industry suddenly become
aware of its existence at date zero. There is a menu of technologies indexed by z —
4
the waiting time until production starts. If it commits to technology z, the firm’s
output depends on the firm’s age, t, as follows:
yt =



0 if t < z

1 with prob. φz
0 with prob. 1− φz
if t ≥ z
, (1)
where φz < 1 is the probability that technology z would succeed for the given firm.
The outcomes are independent over firms, so that with a continuum of firms, φz is
also the fraction of such firms that succeed to produce. The firm must be present in
the industry throughout the period to learn and to adapt the chosen technology for
production in the industry. While it develops its technology the firm forgoes income
of w per unit of time.
We shall assume that immediate production is infeasible for any of the technologies
on the menu, so that φ0 = 0. At some point L, φz starts to rise above zero and
asymptotes to a value not exceeding unity. Figure 1 plots two possible φz.
We shall show that no successful producers will choose to exit. This means that
output can only rise or, at least remains constant. Thus pt must fall over time. This
implies that all entries take place at t = 0, and firms whose technologies fail to deliver
at the chosen z would exit the industry permanently to return to earning w elsewhere.
The present value, Vz, that goes with technology z is
Vz = e
−rz
µ
[1− φz]
w
r
+ φz
Z ∞
z
e−r(s−z)psds
¶
, (2)
where r is the rate of interest. Let Nz be the mass of firms adopting technology with
a waiting time not longer than z. If N is continuous, we define nz = N 0z. Industry
output at t is
qt =
Z t
0
φzdNz.
Equilibrium.–is the pair of functions (p,N) that satisfies:
5
Fig. 1. Two learning curves
1. Market clearing:
qt = D(pt). (3)
2. Free entry:
Vz =
w
r
, (4)
for all z in the support of N and
Vz ≤
w
r
,
outside the support of N.
Note from (4) and (2) that the successful producers are strictly better off if they
remain in the industry. Hence indeed no successful entrants would choose to exit.
2.1 One—technology example
As a preamble to the analysis for which firms face genuine tradeoffs in their tech-
nology choices, it is instructive to examine the simpler case in which no such tradeoffs
6
exist. Suppose
φz =



0 if z < bz,bφ if z ≥ bz.
Choosing a z < bz is a lost cause and a z > bz is wasteful. Technology choice is trivially
at z = bz for all entrants. The zero-profit condition is
w
r
= e−rbz µh1− bφi w
r
+ bφp
r
¶
,
where p is the equilibrium price at time bz and thereafter. Rearranging,
p =

1 +
erbz − 1bφ

w. (5)
There is a percentage markup of price over marginal cost equal to e
rbz−1bφ , which is
increasing in bz and decreasing in bφ.
All Nbz entrants at time 0 would stay until t = bz. Then at t = bz, a fraction bφ of the
entrants begin production, and so output from thereafter is qt = Nbzbφ. Since firm size
is fixed at 1, equilibrium price is a function of technology only. The demand curve
determines only the number of entrants, Nbz, via the condition:
Nbz = 1bφD



1 +
erbz − 1bφ

w

 .
Because technology choice is trivially at bz for all entrants, there would only be
trivial dynamics in pt and qt : pt = D−1 (0) and qt = 0 until t = z; thereafter pt falls
to and stays at the level given in (5) , while qt rises to and stays at Nbzbφ. Further
all exits take place at the same time z. True, firms do experience different fortunes
over time as only a fraction of all entrants successfully make the transition to become
bona fide producers. But such is not enough to paint a picture where p falls and q
rises gradually, and technology choices are dispersed and exits are staggered.
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Fig. 2. Identical technology choice
2.2 Two—technology example
Since everyone prefers a shorter waiting time and a higher success probability, we
can rule out choices of z at which φz is non—increasing. But if φz is strictly increasing
over at least a given range of waiting times, firms would face genuine tradeoffs between
shorter waiting times and higher success probabilities. To analyze this tradeoff in the
simplest setting possible, assume
φz =



0 if z < z1
φ1 if z1 ≤ z < z2
φ2 if z ≥ z2
,
for some z2 > z1 and φ2 > φ1. Each firm’s technology choice is between the more
ambitious z1 and the more certain z2.
By (5), if all entrants adopt the same technology zi, i = 1 or 2, the equilibrium
price from time zi and thereafter would be
ρzi ≡ w
Ã
1 +
erzi − 1
φi
!
.
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First, assume ρz2 > ρz1, as depicted in figure 2. Say all entrants adopt technology
z2. But then there must be positive expected profit for a deviating firm that adopts
technology z1. This firm only requires pt = ρz1 , for t ≥ z1, to break even. But in an
“all z2 equilibrium”,
pt =



D−1 (0) t < z2
ρz2 t ≥ z2
.
Moreover, there cannot be an equilibrium in which both z1 and z2 are adopted. In
any such equilibrium, for t ≥ z2, pt = ρz2 must still hold. In case both z1 and z2 are
chosen, we must have qz1 < qz2 ; thus for t ∈ [z1, z2), pt > ρz2
³
> ρz1
´
. Indeed, in case
ρz2 > ρz1 , the unique equilibrium is where all entrants adopt z1. This is equilibrium
since any deviating firm adopting z2 requires pt = ρz2 for t ≥ z2 to break even, but
for all such times, pt remains equal to ρz1
³
< ρz2
´
in equilibrium.
Next suppose ρz1 > ρz2 instead, as depicted in figure 3. Can equilibrium still be
all entrants choosing the same shorter waiting time z1? A deviating firm choosing
z2 in an “all z1 equilibrium” can more than break even since in such an equilibrium,
pt = ρz1 > ρz2 , for all t ≥ z1 > z2. The equilibrium cannot be all entrants choosing
the same longer waiting time z2 either if the maximum price the market will bear,
D−1 (0) , is sufficiently high. In an “all z2 equilibrium”, a deviating firm adopting
z1 could sell at pt = D−1 (0), for t ∈ [z1, z2). If this D−1 (0) is sufficiently high, the
expected discounted profit could well rise above w/r for the deviating firm. In this
case, both z1 and z2 be would adopted in the unique equilibrium.
In this 2-technology example, the nature of equilibrium depends crucially on whether
or not ρz2 < ρz1 holds, or equivalently,
φ2
φ1
>
erz2 − 1
erz1 − 1 . (6)
If the condition is met, both technologies would be adopted in equilibrium. Otherwise,
the option to wait out a longer period of time before attempting production would
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Fig. 3. Dispersed technology choice
not be taken up by firms. Condition (6) is only met if φ2 exceeds φ1 by more than an
amount that is a function of the forgone income of waiting out longer. In this case
and only in this case, firms find it worthwhile to wait out longer than is absolutely
necessary before attempting production.
Moreover, in the 2—technology example, the last technology adopted is the one with
the lower ρz. Intuitively, entry should not have stopped if the long—run equilibrium
price can possibly be lower still. But it should not have proceeded past where the
long—run equilibrium price is lowest either.
Finally, in this example, as in where the technology choice is trivially at a given z,
demand plays no role in determining {pt} as long as there is a sufficiently highD−1 (0) .
Would these conjectures apply in general where φz is continuously increasing over a
range of waiting times? To this we now turn.
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3. DISPERSED TECHNOLOGY CHOICE AND WAITING TIME
We begin the analysis by assuming that adoption is spread out over some interval
[τ , T ]. Having derived some results in this way, we shall then show that adoption is
indeed spread out as we claim. But first we can rule out a mass of producers adopting
the same technology z, except possibly at the lowest z.
Proposition 1 Suppose D is continuous and that φ0z > 0 for z ∈ [τ , T ], and that N
is increasing on [τ , T ] . Then N is continuous on [τ , T ].
Proof. Let ξz =
R∞
z e
−r(s−z)psds. Then since each z ∈ [τ , T ] is chosen by some firm,
Vz = e
−rz
µ
[1− φz]
w
r
+ φzξz
¶
=
w
r
is constant on [τ , T ]. Therefore V 0 = V 00 = 0 on [τ , T ]. That V 00 = 0 implies that ξ0
is continuous. But
ξ0 = −pz + rξ
so that pz = rξ − ξ0 is continuous. And continuity of D then implies that N too is
continuous.
A corollary of proposition 1 is that:
Corollary 1 If D is continuous and that φ0z > 0 for z ≥ L, the only possible mass
point in N is at z = L, and for all z > L, N must be continuous.
Although the conditions referred to in corollary 1 are not the only set of conditions
under which technology choices and waiting times would be dispersed in equilibrium,
they do refer to an environment most amenable to analysis. We proceed with the
analysis under such an environment. First if N has supports over [τ , T ] , where τ ≥ L,
combining (2) and (4) and rearranging, for all t ∈ [τ , T ],
w
r
Ã
1 +
ert − 1
φt
!
=
Z ∞
t
e−r(s−t)psds. (7)
11
Differentiating with respect to t,
w
r
Ã
rertφt − φ0t (ert − 1)
φ2t
!
= −pt + r
Z ∞
t
e−r(s−t)psds.
But from (7),
r
Z ∞
t
e−r(s−t)psds = w
Ã
1 +
ert − 1
φt
!
,
and hence
pt = w
Ã
1 +
φ0t
φ2t
ert − 1
r
− 1
φt
!
. (8)
This is the solution for pt, t ∈ [τ , T ] .
We must yet determine the interval [τ , T ]. At T and thereafter, output becomes
stationary, and so does price. If T is the last technology adopted, equilibrium price
thereafter is given by
pT = ρT ≡ w
Ã
1 +
erT − 1
φT
!
. (9)
But this must be the same as the RHS of (8) when evaluated at T . Thus we have the
restriction; i.e., the implicit function for T :
φ0T
φT
erT − 1
r
= erT . (10)
Next, we determine τ . There are two cases to consider.
1. D−1 (0) > pL, where pL is the RHS of (8) evaluated at t = L. In order that
pτ = pL when production first begins, there will have to be a mass of entrants
NL at L satisfying
pL = D
−1 (NLφL) . (11)
2. D−1 (0) < pL. Here τ satisfies
pτ = D
−1 (0) , (12)
in which case N has no mass points throughout.
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All this pins down pt and the interval [τ , T ] on which it is defined. In the above
derivation, we assume that there are no holes in Nz on [τ , T ]. This is guaranteed to
be the case as long as long as
1. pt, as defined in (8) , is strictly decreasing on [τ , T ] .1
For (8)− (12) to constitute a unique equilibrium, we also require that
2. pt stays above w on [τ , T ] .
3. A unique and positive solution to (10) exists.
4. No one would want to enter outside of the support of N ; i.e.,
Vz ≤
w
r
for z /∈ [τ , T ] .
Proposition 2 A unique equilibrium where technology choices are dispersed, as char-
acterized by (8)− (12) , exists if, in addition to the conditions stated in corollary 1,
−φ
0
t
φt
³
ert − 1
´
+ rert < 0, (13)
for t arbitrarily close to L, and
φ00t
φ0t
≤ r, (14)
for all t ≥ L.
We illustrate the idea of the proposition in figure 4. First ρt, which is the long-run
equilibrium price as a function of the date when output stabilizes, is plotted as an
U-shaped curve. Given that φt is bounded below 1, ρt, as can be seen from (9), must
eventually slope upward. Differentiating (9) yields the LHS of (13). Thus, if (13)
holds, ρt must first slope downward.
1Suppose there is some subinterval [t1, t2] within [τ , T ] , along which N has no positive support.
Then pt = pt1 , for all t ∈ [t1, t2], which contradicts a strictly decreasing pt, as given by (8), over the
entire [τ , T ] interval.
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Fig. 4. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Next we can use (13) to verify that, over the interval where ρt is decreasing, pt as
defined by (8) does stay above w. Moreover if (14) holds, it is strictly decreasing.2
The date when output stabilizes T is given by (10) . But then (10) holds at where the
LHS of (13) vanishes. Insofar as the LHS of (13) is the slope of ρt, T is at where ρ is
at the minimum. The last technology to be adopted must help bring forth the lowest
long—run equilibrium price.
The similarity of price determination in figure 4 with the textbook Marshallian
model of a competitive industry is apparent. In the latter model, free entry ensures
that, in the long run, the price is equal to the minimum of the U—shaped average cost,
at which average and marginal costs are equated. In the present model, the long—
2Differentiate (8) with respect to t :
∂pt
∂t
=
µ
2
·
rert − φ
0
t
φt
¡
ert − 1
¢¸
+
·¡
ert − 1
¢µφ00t
φ0t
− r
¶¸¶
φ0t
φ2t
w
r
,
which is guarantied to be negative if (13) and (14) hold.
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run equilibrium price is equal to the minimum of the U—shaped ρt curve at which
the ρt and the pt curves intersect. This long—run equilibrium is reached gradually
as successive cohorts of entrants turn to become bona fide producers over time, in a
process akin to how entries are thought to drive individual firms to move down the
marginal cost curve in the textbook model.
The final step in establishing the existence of equilibrium is to make sure that no
firms find it advantageous to enter outside [τ , T ] : If output stabilized at T, for all
t ≥ T , pt = ρT . Entry at any z > T would have yielded a value equal to w/r if, for
all t ≥ z, pt = ρz. Now that T minimizes ρ, for all z > T, ρz > ρT = pT . Entering at
any z > T must then yield a value below w/r.
In figure 4, we assume D−1 (0) < pL, so that pτ = D−1 (0). In this case, the value
of entering at some z < τ would have been equal to w/r if pt had followed (8) for all
t ∈ [z, T ]. But for all t ∈ [0, τ ], pt = D−1 (0) instead. Entering at any z < τ must
then yield a value below w/r. In case D−1 (0) > pL, τ = L. Clearly, no one would
want to enter at any z < L, with φz assumed equal to 0 for all such waiting times.
The key to dispersed technology choice is condition (13), which can be rewritten
as
φ0t
φt
>
rert
ert − 1 . (15)
This is the counterpart of (6) in the 2—technology example. In the present analysis
and in the 2—technology example, whether or not firms would ever wish to wait out
longer than is absolutely necessary before attempting production hinges on whether
there would be a lower long—run equilibrium price to follow. In turn, this will be
the case when the profile of success probability is sufficiently steep over a range of
technology choice. That is, when (15) above and (6) for the 2—technology example
hold.
We now resume to complete the characterization of equilibrium. When the condi-
tions of proposition 2 are met, N is differentiable. This allows us to determine nt as
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follows: From (3), Z t
τ
φsnsds = D (pt) .
Differentiating and rearranging,
nt =
1
φt
D0 (pt)
dpt
dt
. (16)
Since we know pt we also know dpt/dt, and so we have nt.
4. LEARNING CURVE AND INDUSTRY LIFECYCLE — TWO
EXAMPLES
Our goal in this section is to describe how a new industry would evolve under two
different scenarios : (i) when very little is known about what would work in the
new industry, and (ii) when the technology used in the new industry is expected
to be very similar to those used elsewhere. In the first scenario, the payoffs for
waiting out longer before attempting production to learn what may work could be
bountiful. This corresponds to, in our model, a φz function that rises rather gradually
as z increases. Learning in the industry is primarily active in the sense of Ericson
and Pakes (1995, 1998), where an individual firm’s survival is largely determined
by its choice of learning investment in terms of time lost to production. In the
second scenario, on the contrary, the necessary adaptations of existing technologies
would be relatively minor. The φz function in such an industry would rise toward
its upper bound relatively rapidly. Learning in this case is primarily passive in the
sense of Jovanovic (1982), where learning investment plays a relative minor role in
an individual firm’s survival probability, which depends largely on the firm’s initial
endowement.
Specifically, we examine the technology choices and evolutions of pt and qt under
two specifications of φz :
1. φSz = 0.01z
2 − 0.00038z3,
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2. φRz = 0.105z + 0.018z
2 − 0.002z3,
for z ≥ L = 0.5. The two learning curves are those plotted in figure 1. In the analysis
to follow, we set r = 0.05 to give a unit of time an interpretation of a year, and
assume w = 1 and a demand curve: D (p) ≡ (12− p)6, whereby D−1 (0) = 12.
The major implication of our analysis is that diffusion should be more gradual when
there is a longer range of waiting times over which ρz remains downward sloping, or
equivalently, when there is a longer range of waiting times over which φz remains
relatively steep. Hence, the major difference in the life—cycles of the two industries
seems to be that there should be more gradual and protracted output increase under
the more gentle learning curve φSz (active learning) than under the more rapid learning
curve φRz (passive learning).
τ T T − τ pT/pτ
φSz 3.25 10.87 7.62 0.17
φRz 0.5 3.57 3.07 0.69
Table 1 : Two industry lifecycles
In table 1, we report the various characteristics of the life—cycles of the two indus-
tries. Under φSz , pL > D
−1 (0), and there are no mass points throughout N . In this
case, τ is pinned down by pτ = D−1 (0) = 12. Under φ
R
z , pL < D
−1 (0), however, and
so τ = L, and equilibrium is supported by a mass of entrants at τ = L. Under the
more gentle learning curve φSz , where learning is primarily active, there is indeed more
protracted diffusion inasmuch as [τ , T ] spans a longer time interval than when learn-
ing is relatively rapid and passive as under φRz . To accompany the more protracted
diffusion, industry φSz also experiences a more substantial fall in pt, and therefore a
greater output increase over time. That output increase should be more gradual but
also more substantial under active, as opposed to passive, learning is a conclusion also
reached in Ericson and Pakes (1998) under rather different specifications of the two
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types of learning. Perhaps then this difference should be considered as a rather robust
prediction of how, in a broad sense, active learning compares with passive learning.
Output increase under φSz is not just more protracted but also more S—shaped
than under φRz , as shown in figures 5 and 6, respectively. The S—shaped diffusion
curve, along which output first increases at an increasing rate, has been reported
to well describe the pattern of output increase in many industries since Griliches
(1957). Figures 7 and 8 show, respectively, that technology choices under φSz are
more dispersed and bell—shaped than under φRz .
3 The S—shaped diffusion curve in
figure 5 then seems to have been a result of the bell-shaped pattern of technology
choice in figure 7 : Output would increase at an increasing rate for a period of time
if nt increases rapidly in the interim. Previous theoretical analyses largely rely on
some kinds of ex-ante heterogeneity among firms or external effect, whether explicit
or implicit, to help generate a S—shaped diffusion curve.4 In contrast, the present
analysis shows that a S—shaped diffusion curve may arise in the entire absence of any
ex-ante heterogeneity among producers and non—pecuniary externality.
Finally, the present analysis suggests that passive and active learning may also be
distinguished by the patterns of exit. If under passive learning, the choices of lead
times tend to cluster temporally as shown in figure 8, so do exits. Then the shakeout,
defined by Gort and Klepper (1982) as the episode when the number of producers in
an industry is falling from its peak, comes sooner, is more discernable, and ends more
abruptly.5
3In fact, technology choices under φRz are even more concentrated at the first available technology
z = L than is shown in figure 8, where a mass of entrants adopting z = L is not depicted in the
figure.
4Jovanovic and Lach (1989) and Davies (1979), for example. See also the surveys in Lissoni and
Metcalfe (1994) and Geroski (2000).
5Jovanovic and Tse (2006), in a vintage capital model, find that the shakeout should come sooner
when technological change proceeds at a faster pace. The present analysis presumes a shakeout a
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Fig. 5. qt under φ
S
z : A more protracted and S—shaped diffusion
Fig. 6. qt under φ
R
z : A more rapid diffusion
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Fig. 7. nt under φ
S
z : Bell—shaped and dispersed
Fig. 8. nt under φ
R
t :Skewed and concentrated
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5. MARKET SIZE, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND DIFFUSION
A ubiquitous implication of models of learning by doing is that market size and the
distribution of income among consumers, through their impacts on demand, could
play important roles in determining the pace of diffusion (Jovanovic and Lach (1989);
Matsuyama (2002)) A larger population of all consumers in general and a larger
population of high income consumers in particular raise the profitability of entry and
investment at the outset. Subsequent entrants then benefit from the industry—wide
learning by doing that originated from the higher initial entry. All this speeds up
the diffusion to low income consumers. The present model is a model of learning by
doing in which the time that an entrant must wait before production commences is
a period of learning and adaptation. But where the benefits of learning are purely
internal, demand plays no role in determining the pace of diffusion.
The argument can be formalized as follow. Suppose the market is populated by a
continuum of H consumers, each of whom share the same preference :
u = Iv + x,
where I = 1 if the consumer buys a unit of the good and 0 otherwise, v the value the
consumer attributes to the consumption of the good, and x the quantity of an outside
good consumed. Consumer i has income yi to be allocated between the purchases of
the two goods:
Ip+ x ≤ yi,
where we normalize the price of the outside good to 1. No borrowing nor lending is
allowed. Hence if yi < p, consumer i spends his entire budget on the outside good.
priori, and is concerned with factors that determine the characters of the shakeout. This stands in
contrast but is complementary to Utterback and Suarez (1993), Hopenhayn (1993), Jovanovic and
MacDonald (1994), Klepper and Miller (1995) and Klepper (1996, 2002) and Jovanovic and Tse
(2006), whose focuses are on factors that help give rise to the shakeout.
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If yi ≥ p, the good becomes affordable, and consumer i will buy one unit if v > p as
well. That is, consumer i will buy if p ≤ min {yi, v}. Let the distribution of income
among consumers be given by G (y), with upper support equal to y. If v > y, the
quantity demanded at price p is given by
q = H (1−G (p)) . (17)
As p falls over time, the good will reach more and more consumers. Specifically, the
good will diffuse to consumer i at time t, where t solves pt = yi. In the present model,
however, pt is entirely determined by φz and w; it is invariant to the parameters of
the demand curve. Neither market size H nor the distribution of income G has any
effects at all on when a consumer with a given income may first start to buy.
Market size and income distribution affect equilibrium only in terms of qt and nt.
By (17), with pt staying at the same level asH varies, qt will rise in straight proportion
to increases in H. The same conclusion applies to nt too, as can be seen by a simple
substitution of (17) into (16).
6. MONOPOLY
In competitive markets, we find that the long—run equilibrium price minimizes ρz.
The extent of dispersion in technology choice and the rapidity of diffusion depends
on for how far ρz remains decreasing. Does a monopoly tend to adopt a wider or a
narrower range of waiting times? Or equivalently, does market power result in more
or less rapid diffusion?
Consider a monopoly hiring some MT managers at date 0, each of whom will be
assigned to work on a given technology. When the waiting time of a given technology
is over, the monopoly will release the assigned manager if the technology fails to
deliver. The wage per unit of time is the opportunity cost of managers, w. The
monopoly chooses the number of managers to be assigned to technology z = t, mt,
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to maximize
Π =
Z ∞
0
e−rt
h
D−1 (qt) qt − (MT −Xt)w
i
dt (18)
subject to
dqt
dt
= mtφt, q0 = 0; (19)
dXt
dt
= mt (1− φt) , X0 = 0; (20)
Mt =
Z t
0
msds. (21)
In (18) and (20) , Xt denotes cumulative exit at time t, and hence MT −Xt denotes
the number of managers who remain employed by the monopoly at time t. We prove
in the appendix that:
Proposition 3 Assuming the conditions in proportion 2 are met, the monopoly chooses
the same interval [τ , T ] on which mz > 0 as the interval selected in competition. For
each t ∈ [τ , T ] , the monopoly’s optimum satisfies
µt = w
Ã
1 +
φ0t
φ2t
ert − 1
r
− 1
φt
!
, (22)
where
µt =
³
D−1
´0
(qt) qt + pt
is the monopoly’s marginal revenue.
The next step is to determine whether there would be any systematic bias for the
monopoly to cluster his technology choices around any particular z ∈ [τ , T ] relative to
the profile of technologies chosen in competition. The answer seems to be no. Observe
that the competitive equilibrium price coincides with the left side of (22). True, the
monopoly produces less at each t, but otherwise, its marginal revenue is set equal to
the competitive price at each t. Hence the output restriction at each t is, roughly
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speaking, uniform. If we assume a demand curve of the form qt = A (p− pt)α , for
some A > 0, α > 0, and p ≥ 0, we can show that
mz = nz
µ α
1 + α
¶α
. (23)
Where mz is proportional to nz, the probability densities of technology choice under
monopoly and competition just coincide for all z ∈ [τ , T ] .
7. CONCLUSION
This paper started out arguing that entrants to a new industry could face non—
trivial choices among technologies with different lead times and success probabilities.
We then showed that how in this environment, there can be gradual diffusion, and how
competition minimizes the long—run equilibrium price, via selecting the technology
consistent with the least long—run price as the last technology to be adopted. When
learning opportunities are more bountiful, diffusion tends to be more gradual and
exits more spread out. On the contrary, when learning opportunities are more limited,
the choices of lead times and thereby exits would cluster temporally. Furthermore,
we showed how under internal, as opposed to external, learning by doing, demand
plays at most a minimal role in determining the rate of diffusion. Finally, a similar
conclusion holds with respect to market structure, whereby a monopoly would choose
a rate of diffusion similar to the rate of diffusion under competition.
APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 3.–
The problem is almost a standard optimal control problem, except for the integral
constraint in (21) . To make it amendable to standard optimal control techniques, we
define a new state variable:
γt = −
Z t
0
msds,
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whereby
dγt
dt
= −mt. (24)
The initial and terminal conditions on γt are, respectively,
γ0 = 0 and γT = −MT , (25)
where the latter is simply a restatement of (21). The integral constraint in (21) can
thus be replaced by (24) and (25) . Further, rewrite (18) as
Π = Π1 − w
r
MT , (26)
where
Π1 =
Z ∞
0
e−rt
h
D−1 (qt) qt +Xtw
i
dt. (27)
The maximization of Π proceeds in two stages. First, we fix MT at some arbitrary
value and maximize Π1 subject to (19) , (20) , (24) , and (25) . This step yields the
maximized value of Π1 as a function of MT . We then proceed to maximize Π with
respect to MT .
Step 1: Write the Hamiltonian of (27) as
Ht = e−rt
h
D−1 (qt) qt +Xtw
i
+ λqtmtφt + λ
X
t mt (1− φt)− λγtmt,
where λqt , λ
X
t , and λ
γ
t are the co—state variables of the respective constraints. The
necessary conditions for maximum are
λqtφt + λ
X
t (1− φt)− λγt ≤ 0 (with equality if mt > 0) , (28)
dλqt
dt
= −ertµ (qt) , where µ (qt) =
³
D−1
´0
(qt) qt +D
−1 (qt) , (29)
dλXt
dt
= −e−rtw, (30)
dλγt
dt
= 0, (31)
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lim
t→∞
λqt = limt→∞λ
X
t = 0, (32)
in addition to (19) , (20) , (24) , and (25) . Now by (31), λγt is time—stationary, and
we may drop the time subscript. Integrating both sides of (30), while making use of
(32) , yields
λXt = e
−rtw
r
. (33)
Suppose mt > 0 over some interval [τ , T ]. For t ∈ [τ , T ] , (28) holds as an equality:
λqt =
1
φt
µ
λγ − e−rtw
r
(1− φt)
¶
,
where we have made use of (33) to substitute out λXt . Differentiating:
dλqt
dt
= −φ
0
t
φ2t
µ
λγ − e−rtw
r
[1− φt]
¶
+
1
φt
µ
e−rtw [1− φt] + e−rt
w
r
φ0t
¶
.
Setting the RHS of the above equal to the RHS of (29) and simplifying,
µ (qt) =
φ0t
φ2t
ertλγ − w
r
"
φ0t
φ2t
+
1− φt
φt
r
#
. (34)
This characterizes the time-path of output over the interval [τ , T ] as a function of λγ .
Step 2: λγ , as the Lagrange multiplier of (24) and (25) in the maximization of Π1,
satisfies6
∂Π1
∂γT
= −λγ.
But γT = −MT ; hence
∂Π1
∂MT
= λγ .
The first order condition of maximizing (26) is then
λγ =
w
r
.
Substituting the above into (34) and simplifying yield (22). The boundaries of the
interval [τ , T ] are yet to be determined. When mt first turns positive, qt = 0. At zero
6See Chiang (1992), p.206.
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output, the marginal revenue of the monopoly is simply D−1 (0) . Then τ solves
D−1 (0) =
Ã
1 +
φ0τ
φ2τ
erτ − 1
r
− 1
φτ
!
w.
This derivation assumes D−1 (0) exceeds the RHS of the above evaluated at τ =
L. Were this condition not met, τ = L, analogous to how τ is pinned down in
competitive markets in such circumstances. To determine T, observe that the value
to the monopoly of hiring the last manager is
φT
Z ∞
T
µ (qT ) e
−rtdt,
whereas the cost is Z T
0
we−rtdt+ φT
Z ∞
T
we−rtdt,
and they must be equalized to maximize profit. This yields, after some simplification,
µ (qT ) =
1− e−rT (1− φT )
e−rTφT
w.
Equating the RHS of this equation to the RHS of (22) and evaluating at T yields
exactly (10).
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